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NOTES

Undercutting Employee Mobility
THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT IN THE
TRADE SECRET CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congressman Bill Hughes stood before the U.S.
House of Representatives to describe what type of person the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)1 was directed toward:
“The hacker is . . . a bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious
youth,” who could “become the white-collar crime superstar of
tomorrow.”2 Hughes warned his colleagues that in this new
iteration of corporate crime, “[t]he tools of the trade [will not
be] Smith and Wesson, but IBM and Apple.”3
A number of factors contributed to the public
apprehension of computer crime reflected in Hughes’s statement.
Perhaps most important was the sudden and explosive rise of the
personal computer, beginning in the late 1970s.4 While initially
popular in the home, personal computers quickly took hold in the
workplace in the early 1980s, meaning that a wider variety of
1 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988)).
2 132 CONG. REC. 7816 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes).
3 Id.
4 As a testament to the explosive growth of personal computers during this
time, consider that the Commodore 64, released in 1982, sold between 12.5 and 17
million units, making it to this day the best-selling personal computer of all time.
Gareth Halfacre, The Commodore 64 Turns 30, BIT-TECH.NET (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.bit-tech.net/news/hardware/2012/08/01/commodore-64-30/1; see also Lisa
Fritscher, Commodore 64: The Best Selling Personal Computer of All Time, RETRO THING
(Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.retrothing.com/2008/10/commodore-64-th.html; Jeremy Reimer,
Total share: 30 Years of Personal Computer Market Share Figures, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 15,
2005), http://arstechnica.com/features/2005/12/total-share/3/ (describing the first three
highly successful personal computers released between 1977 and 1980: the Commodore
PET, the Radio-Shack TRS-80, and the Apple).
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valuable and sensitive information was stored in a digital form.5
As this novel technology quickly became a large part of
American work and home life, computers moved into the
spotlight of both news and entertainment.6 A number of movies
released during this time depicted and risibly exaggerated the
potential for people to commit crime and wreak havoc using
computers, adding to public concern.7 For example, in the movie
WarGames, “a teenaged computer hacker who, thinking he was
merely playing a game, inadvertently accessed a Department of
Defense
computer
system
and
nearly
precipitated
thermonuclear war.”8 However the tipping point for legislators
like Hughes came in 1984, when the findings of several private
reports on cyber crime were “magnified by a groundswell of
media attention toward computer crime generated by a number
of incidents involving juvenile computer hackers.”9
Having initially deferred to state-level regulation on the
issue of computer crime, Congress ultimately gave in to public
sentiment, and in 1984 enacted the CFAA as the first federal
legislation directed specifically toward computer crime.10 The
original act was relatively narrow in scope, addressing only a
small number of sophisticated computer crimes leveled against
the government and financial institutions.11 But the statute’s
narrow reach would not last long. A number of subsequent
5 See Greggory S. Blundell, Personal Computers in the Eighties, BYTE, Jan. 1983,
at 168, available at http://archive.org/stream/byte-magazine-1983-01/1983_01_BYTE_0801_Looking_Ahead#page/n175/mode/2up. During “the late 1970’s and early 1980’s . . . [n]ew
managers entering the business community brought with them a keen awareness of
computer systems gained from both college study and home use.” Id.
6 For example, in 1982 Time Magazine awarded its Person of the Year award to
the computer, which Time deemed “Machine of the Year,” making it the first time a nonhuman received the honor. A Letter From the Publisher: Jan. 3, 1983, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983,
available at http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/printout/0,8816,953629,00.html; see
also Reimer, supra note 4.
7 See Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl><Alt><Delete>: Rethinking Federal
Computer Crime Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 596 (1997); see also Reid
Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 910 (2003).
8 Olivenbaum, supra note 7, at 596.
9 Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 460 (1990). One such group of
juvenile computer hackers was a collective of Milwaukee area teens known as the 414s,
who in 1983 hacked the networks of a number of high profile institutions, including
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and Los Alamos National Laboratory. Philip
Elmer-Dewitt, Computers: The 414 Gang Strikes Again, TIME, Aug. 29, 1983, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,949797,00.html.
10 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). The short title of
the statute was amended to its current form in 1986, when it became the “Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986.” Pub. L. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 § 1 (1986).
11 See Griffith, supra note 9, at 460-61.
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amendments, notably in 1986, 1994, and 1996, greatly altered
and expanded the CFAA by increasing the number of crimes
covered under the act, relaxing pleading standards, creating a
private right of action, and expanding the statute’s scope to
cover not just government and financial institution computers,
but any computer connected to the internet.12
While the expanded CFAA is still invoked against
sophisticated computer hackers,13 the amendments have also
created a dramatic rise in private litigation, in many cases
involving defendants with only a rudimentary understanding of
computers.14 For example, a private cause of action exists under
the CFAA against anyone who “intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains . . . information from any . . . computer [in
use in interstate commerce].”15 Since 2000, employers have
increasingly invoked these CFAA provisions against so-called
“rogue employees” who misappropriate valuable trade secrets
from a company before going to work for a competitor.16
Traditionally, such a scenario would be addressed by state-level
trade secret misappropriation statutes, many of which define a
trade secret as “information . . . that . . . derives independent
economic value . . . from not being generally known [and] is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.”17 But when a computer is involved in the
misappropriation, the issue appears to fall within the CFAA’s
ambit.18 In an attempt to restrict or uphold the CFAA’s
12 See Part II infra (describing the numerous amendments broadening the
CFAA’s scope and substantive impact).
13 For example, in 2011, computer programmer and internet activist Aaron
Swartz was indicted under three provisions of the CFAA for manipulating MIT’s
computer network and subsequently “downloading over 4 million documents from JSTOR,
a[n academic] research database.” Chris Gayomali, Reddit Co-Founder Aaron Swartz
Indicted for Data Theft, Could Face 35 Years in Prison, TIME, July 19, 2011, available at
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/19/reddit-co-founder-aaron-swartz-indicted-for-data-theftcould-face-35-years-in-prison/.
14 See Part II infra (describing the facts of Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v.
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000), in which defendant
simply emailed documents from his current employer to his prospective employer).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)2(C) (2012). In this section the term “obtains” has been
broadly defined to include even looking at information on a computer. Matthew
Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Should be
Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 405, 416 n.60
(2012) (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986)).
16 See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.,
119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1122-23 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
17 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985); see also infra note 36
(discussing the definition of a trade secret under the UTSA).
18 Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 430.
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applicability in such contexts, many jurists and commentators
have focused on the authorization provision of the CFAA,
specifically the requirement that to establish liability, one must
access a computer “without authorization or exceed[ing]
authorized access.”19 A broad interpretation of authorization,
grounded in principles of agency law, holds that an employee
can act without authorization even when granted full access to
a computer system, by simply taking action at odds with his or
her employer’s interests.20 In contrast, a narrow approach to
authorization turns not on the employee’s actions, but rather
on the restrictions put in place by the employer.21
Firmly establishing a narrow interpretation of
authorization under the CFAA will bring the statute closer to
its intended purpose of targeting sophisticated computer
criminals. Resolving this issue, however, does not address the
fact that reliance on the CFAA threatens to undercut policy
considerations of trade secret law. In particular, trade secret law
strikes an important balance between protecting valuable
company information on the one hand, and promoting the
mobility of knowledge-based workers on the other hand. The
CFAA undercuts and ignores this balance.22 As employers
increasingly turn to the CFAA as a favorable alternative to
state-level trade secret statutes, a more sensible course of action
is to amend the CFAA to adopt some limited substantive
elements of trade secret law. Such an amendment would serve to
diminish the CFAA’s utility as an end run on state-level trade
secret statutes, and in turn prevent the CFAA from
undercutting policy considerations advanced by trade secret law.
Specifically, Congress should amend the CFAA to
include a requirement that to establish liability, information
misappropriated from a protected computer must have been
“the subject of efforts . . . reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy,” mirroring a provision in the Uniform

19 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)2(C). See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:
Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1596, 1649 (2003).
20 See Part II infra (outlining the agency-based approach to authorization);
see also Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. at 1125 (citations omitted).
21 See Part II infra (outlining the narrow approach to authorization); see also
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that
“‘authorization’ depends on actions taken by the employer”).
22 See Brenton, supra note 18, at 447. “From a normative viewpoint, the crux
of why trade secret law is better than the CFAA [is because trade secret law] . . .
strikes a balance between safeguarding business information and guaranteeing
employee mobility.”
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Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).23 This amendment would preserve
the CFAA’s utility as a means of redressing sophisticated data
theft and sabotage, while preserving trade secret law’s careful
balance between protecting valuable confidential information
and promoting employee mobility.
Part I examines the historical background of trade secret
law, placing particular emphasis on the policy considerations
embodied in the law. Part II examines the emergence of the
CFAA in the employment context, and the resultant debate over
the meaning of authorization under the CFAA. This section
considers why employers have increasingly relied on the CFAA
over state-level trade secret statutes, and discusses how this
reliance has undercut the policy considerations of trade secret
law. Part III argues that establishing a narrow reading of
“authorization” under the statute will bring the CFAA closer to its
original purpose while protecting the policy goals of trade secret
law. Part IV proposes borrowing from trade secret law, and
enacting a “reasonable efforts” amendment to the CFAA.
A reasonable efforts amendment, combined with a narrow
interpretation of authorization, would preserve the CFAA as a
means of addressing serious breaches of reasonable data security,
while preventing employers from relying on the CFAA’s civil
remedies as an end run on alternative trade secret statutes.
Under this approach, the CFAA would once again be rightly
aimed at stopping “bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious”24
computer hackers instead of targeting opportunistic consultants
armed with USB thumb drives.25
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TRADE SECRET LAW

“Since its emergence in the middle of the nineteenth
century, trade secret law has developed primarily as a creature
of state common law,”26 as a way for companies to protect some of
their most valuable assets from misappropriation. Because of its
organic formulation, trade secret law differs significantly from
many other areas of intellectual property law.27 Where most areas
of intellectual property law (such as copyright and patent law)
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985).
132 CONG. REC. 7816 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes).
25 See SKF USA, Inc. v. Bjerkness, 636 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704, 717 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (where defendants were charged under the CFAA for misappropriating company
information by transferring files to external hard drives and USB thumb drives).
26 Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 247 (1998).
27 Id. at 244.
23
24
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establish an individual “right against the world” in a given idea or
expression, trade secret law “does not impose liability for mere
appropriation. Rather, the appropriator must have acquired,
disclosed, or used the information in a wrongful manner.”28
Proponents of trade secret law argue that this approach
adds efficiency to the marketplace in two ways.29 First, an
“incentive-based argument” posits that protecting trade secrets
creates incentives for companies and individuals to continue
innovating and creating new information without fear of losing it
to a competitor, which is beneficial for the overall marketplace.30
Second, by only protecting information that rises to the level of a
trade secret, trade secret law promotes employee mobility,
allowing employees to take knowledge and skills gained in
previous jobs with them to new jobs, which is beneficial to the
marketplace as a whole.31
This emphasis on employee mobility complements what
appears to be an emerging trend in the employment context, as
average tenure decreases and employees move more
transiently between employers.32 As reduced tenure with a
given employer becomes more common, employees are trading
the expected job security of long-term employment for the
prospect of rapid skill development that comes with sporadic
short-term and increasingly varied work experiences.33 By
allowing employees to freely utilize a significant amount of the
knowledge and skills gained in past jobs without subjecting
themselves to potential misappropriation claims by past
employers,34 trade secret law complements this structural shift in
the employment context. Based on these considerations, it seems
that the real efficiency in trade secret law is in the balance it
strikes between protecting information where necessary on the
one hand, and allowing for employee mobility on the other.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 262.
30 Id.
31 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575, 586 (1999) (“These knowledge spillovers supercharge the innovative capacity of
the district with renewed agglomeration economies, facilitating the development of new
technologies that create a new industrial life cycle.”).
32 See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 554 (2001)
(“Whereas previously, careers were understood to unfold in structured ways, by moving up
job ladders in internal labor markets or along fixed lattices on organizational flow-charts,
recent research on careers has found organizational fluidity.”).
33 Id. at 591 (“[T]he employee’s right to obtain and use the knowledge is often
part of the overall employment package.”).
34 Bone, supra note 26, at 244.
28
29
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While trade secret statutes exist at the state rather
than federal level, nationally promulgated guidelines set out by
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act heavily inform the state-level
statutes, and substantial convergence has developed around
UTSA standards.35 The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.36

As the UTSA demonstrates, to be considered a trade
secret, information must be reasonably protected under the
circumstances.37 This reasonable efforts provision has itself been
the subject of substantial debate.38 While scholars and jurists
continue to debate what constitutes a reasonable effort to protect
information in a given circumstance, the general consensus is
that Congress did not intend for the UTSA to require so called
“super reasonable” measures to establish secrecy.39 A more lenient
approach to what constitutes reasonable trade secret protections
is largely justified in economic terms: requiring companies to

35 Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a
Digital Environment, 49 IDEA 359, 362 n.5 (2009) (explaining that the UTSA has been
adopted as the model for state-level trade secret legislation “in 46 states and the
District of Columbia”).
36 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985) (emphasis added); see also
Graham M. Liccardi, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155,
158 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (“There are three essential elements to a state trade
secret misappropriation claim. First, the information must qualify as a trade secret.
Second, the plaintiff must have made reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure of its
trade secret. Third, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acquired the trade
secret through wrongful means.”).
37 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii).
38 See, e.g., Jermaine S. Grubbs, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at
Trade Secret Protection: Why the “Reasonable Efforts” Taken by Small Businesses
Should be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 421, 425 (2005)
(arguing that small businesses should have a less stringent burden for making out
“reasonable efforts”).
39 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“If trade secrets are protected only if
their owners take extravagant, productivity-impairing measures to maintain their
secrecy, the incentive to invest resources in discovering more efficient methods of
production will be reduced, and with it the amount of invention.”).
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overinvest in securing trade secrets, such as creating
sophisticated data protection systems, would stifle innovation.40
While Herculean efforts to protect data are not required,
it is well-established that requiring some degree of protection
furthers valuable policy goals.41 Suppose plaintiff employer
sues defendant employee for misappropriating company trade
secrets. Requiring reasonably protective efforts under trade
secret law provides direct evidence of the defendant employee’s
wrongdoing, and further suggests that the information was in
fact valuable to the employer.42 From an evidentiary perspective,
having protective measures in place helps to shed light on
situations where a defendant employee has wrongfully
misappropriated information.43 Put simply, when information is
not reasonably protected, it is harder for a fact finder to
determine whether an individual acted wrongfully in
misappropriating that information. Conversely, when data is
reasonably protected, it is easier to infer that the
misappropriation was wrongful.44 In terms of its utility as a proxy
for the value of misappropriated information, protective measures
serve as a signal to the fact finder the information is considered
valuable by its owner and is therefore worthy of judicial
protection.45 As Judge Posner explains, enforcing trade secret law
without requiring such reasonably protective efforts would create
a meaningless distinction between unprotected information and
the public domain, wherein “the plaintiff . . . would enjoy a
windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because the
defendant took the secret from him, rather than from the public
domain as it could have done with impunity.”46 Beyond these
more theoretical justifications, requiring plaintiffs to reasonably
protect their information serves the very practical goal of
“prevent[ing] misappropriation from occurring altogether.”47
Trade secret misappropriation in the employment context
is an undoubtedly serious economic issue for employers,48 and
has only become more widespread by the ease with which
40 See Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 355, 369 (2003)).
41 See Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363.
42 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 925 F.2d at 178.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 179.
46 Id.
47 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363.
48 See Liccardi, supra note 36 (“In September of 2003, Former FBI Director
Robert Mueller stated that U.S. businesses are losing more than $200 billion dollars
annually from theft of intellectual property.”).
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computing technology allows for the transfer of data.49 The
findings of a 2009 study by the Ponemon Institute, a privacy
think tank, highlight the extent to which employees are
misappropriating company data when they leave a job.50
According to the study, which surveyed 945 adults who had
changed jobs in some way over the past year, 59% had stolen
some sort of company data before leaving their job, ranging from
email lists and non-financial business information to employee
records and financial information.51 Survey respondents cited
several reasons for the high levels of data theft, including the
increasing mobility of employees, feelings of entitlement to the
information, and the desire to leverage the information in a new
job.52 Nearly 80% of those surveyed freely admitted that they
knew they were not allowed to take the information.53
Despite the widespread misappropriation of company
data by departing employees, companies seem to be doing
surprisingly little to address this problem.54 For example, only
15% of companies surveyed made a practice of conducting
electronic assessments of documents and files taken by
employees upon termination, and of companies that did conduct
such assessments, the majority were either superficial or
incomplete.55 Further, 24% of departing employees reported that
their access to company data systems continued after
termination, and in over 30% of cases, terminated employees
retained access to company data systems for over a week after
being terminated.56 While many employers attempt to prohibit
data theft by including relevant language in employment and
non-disclosure agreements, simple steps such as ensuring that
computer access is revoked upon termination, and taking stock
of laptops and mobile devices issued to employees remain

49 See Brian Krebs, Data Theft Common by Departing Employees, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-02-26/news/36791861_1_data-theftemployer-job.
50 PONEMON INST. LLC, DATA LOSS RISKS DURING DOWNSIZING: AS EMPLOYEES
EXIT, SO DOES CORPORATE DATA 2 (2009), available at http://media.techtarget.com/
Syndication/NATIONALS/Data_Loss_Risks_During_Downsizing_Feb_23_2009.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 4, 10. Respondents to the study who took data before leaving their
jobs reported the most common ways to take digital files were “downloading
information onto a CD or DVD[,] . . . on to a USB memory stick[, or] . . . sending
documents as attachments to a personal email account.” Id.
53 Id. at 2.
54 See id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 4.
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underutilized.57 In an increasingly digital and virtual workplace,
technological advances “present new reasons—and new ways—to
implement” data protection.58 For example, employers can now
utilize sophisticated and increasingly inexpensive options such as
data and email encryption, multi-level passwords, and even the
ability to remotely wipe sensitive data from company-issued
laptops and mobile devices.59 While many such measures have gone
overlooked,60 employers have relied increasingly on the protections
afforded by the CFAA in protecting their trade secrets.
II.

EMERGENCE OF THE CFAA IN THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTEXT

When Congress enacted the Counterfeit Access Device
and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,61 the act was
relatively narrow in scope, providing criminal penalties for the
unauthorized use of a computer for just three reasons:
to obtain classified United States defense or foreign relations
information with the intent . . . to harm the United States, to obtain
information contained in a financial record of a financial
institution[, and] to use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in,
or prevent authorized use of, a computer operated for or on behalf of
the United States.62

Just two years after the CFAA’s passage, the Justice
Department, frustrated with having to address emergent
computer crime under outdated mail and wire fraud provisions of
the criminal code, urged Congress to broaden coverage under the
CFAA.63 Congress responded in turn by “expand[ing] the scope of
the Act to encompass additional significant types of computer
crime.”64 Over the years, the statute “has been amended

57 Effective Practices: What Technology Issues Should an Employer Consider
When Terminating an Employee?, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (July 13, 2012),
http://www.shrm.org/TemplatesTools/hrqa/Pages/TechnologyConsiderationRelatedtoE
mployeeTermination.aspx [hereinafter Effective Practices].
58 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 364.
59 Id. at 361.
60 Effective Practices, supra note 57.
61 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
62 Griffith, supra note 9, at 460.
63 Pamela Taylor, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 207 (2012); see
also Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.6 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
64 Griffith, supra note 9, at 474.
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eight . . . times,”65 with the most substantial amendments
enacted in 1994 and 1996.
In 1994, as part of the Violent Crime Control and
Prevention Act of 1994, Congress added a private cause of
action to the statute, allowing anyone harmed by a CFAA
violation to seek compensatory and injunctive relief.66 For such
a major amendment to the CFAA, there is no clear record of the
congressional intent behind the decision to establish a private
cause of action.67 While the precise legislative intent may not be
readily apparent, Professor Galbraith notes that “[t]he sponsors
of the amendment made clear . . . that they certainly and
expressly did not want to open the floodgates to frivolous
litigation.”68 An onslaught of private litigation was not a real
concern at the time because when the private cause of action
was added, the CFAA only applied to “federal interest
computers,” which were defined as those computers “operated
by the government or a financial institution.”69
Galbraith points out that this dynamic changed
drastically in 1996, when the statute was amended to increase
the number of computers covered under the CFAA.70
Specifically, the 1996 amendment replaced the term “federal
interest computer” with the term “protected computer,” and
proceeded to define a protected computer as any computer
previously covered under the act, as well as any computer “used
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication.”71 This amendment “effectively extended the
statute’s reach to include any computer connected to the

Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 414.
Section 1030(g) provides in part that “[a]ny person who suffers damage or
loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
67 See Brenton, supra note 18, at 453. Because the amendment was passed as
part of the Violent Crime Control and Prevention Act of 1994, which consisted of over
300 pages of legislation, the legislative history has been called challenging to review.
Id. While the Senate Report mentions that a civil remedy will deter crime by providing
aggrieved individuals with a means to obtain relief, “the language in the remainder of
the report pointing to malicious computer hacking as the motivating force behind the
statute further argues against a broad scope for the legislation.” Id.
68 Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites,
63 MD. L. REV. 320, 329 (2004) (quotation omitted).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 330.
71 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)2(B). This definition was later expanded to include
computers used outside of the United States that impacted interstate commerce. See
United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D. Conn. 2001).
65
66
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Internet.”72 While the bill’s sponsors made clear that the
amendment was designed to increase the protection of private
information stored on both government and civilian computer
networks, the legislative history seems to indicate that the
expansion was narrowly directed at protecting industries that
were beginning to rely on computers as a central part of their
technical infrastructure.73 In any case, it is apparent that the
sponsors did not foresee the sweeping reach that the
amendment would ultimately create.74
While Congress took numerous steps to broaden the
CFAA’s scope, the statute’s pleading standard remained relatively
unchanged.75 The result was a statute that, perhaps
inadvertently, covered a wide range of activities, many of which
could hardly be classified as hacking.76 In one provision commonly
invoked in private causes of actions, the CFAA imposes liability
on an individual who “intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby
obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”77 Another
provision establishes liability when an individual “knowingly and
with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value
[over] . . . $5,000 in any 1-year period.”78 A third provision covers

72 Galbraith, supra note 68, at 330. The legislative history of the 1996
amendment seems to suggest that the amendment’s framers underestimated the pervasive
rise of personal computing that would come to define the amendment’s scope. S. REP. No.
104-357, at 7 (1996) (“[I]ncreasingly computer systems provide the vital backbone to
many other industries, such as transportation, power supply systems, and
telecommunications.”).
73 See S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7 (1996).
74 Galbraith, supra note 68, at 331 (“Noticeably absent from the legislative
history . . . is any suggestion that Congress intended to widen dramatically the protection
of the CFAA to include all information and all computer systems on the Internet, such as
non-copyrightable data contained on publicly accessible websites.”).
75 In fact, all eight amendments to the CFAA since 1986 have only served to
expand the act “by adding substantive offenses, lowering levels of scienter, or
increasing penalties.” Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 415. Further, because the
amendments have continued to expand coverage under the CFAA, some courts have
elected to interpret ambiguity in the statute in favor of an expansive reading. See, e.g.,
United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1261, 1263 (11th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (U.S. 2011) (Social Security Administration
employee charged under the CFAA for using his SSA computer access to obtain
information related to women he was romantically interested in).
77 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)2(C) (2012). See Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 416 n.60
(quotation omitted).
78 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)4.

2014]

UNDERCUTTING EMPLOYEE MOBILITY

843

individuals who intentionally cause damage to a protected
computer by “transmission of a program [or] code.”79
After establishing one of these substantive offenses, the
CFAA allows a private party to obtain compensatory and
injunctive relief after showing the existence of one of five factors,
including “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year
period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value.”80 Courts have read
“loss” here as encompassing both “(1) the loss in value of trade
secrets . . . and confidential information that was not previously
known to the public, and (2) the loss of competitive advantage.”81
As a result of the CFAA’s expanded scope and
straightforward pleading requirements, the “floodgates to frivolous
litigation”82 feared by the sponsors of the 1994 amendment were
inevitably burst open. In fact, “[s]ince 2002, complaints alleging a
cause of action under the CFAA have increased nearly 600[ ]
percent.”83 A far cry from the “bright, intellectually curious, and
rebellious youth”84 described by Congressman Hughes in 1986,
many defendants in recent CFAA litigation know little more
about computers than how to send an email, operate a USB
flash drive, or set up a Myspace profile.85
While trade secret statutes have existed for years at the
state level,86 the expanded CFAA arguably created a second
basis for liability for trade secret misappropriation claims so
long as a computer was involved.87 Where such claims would
79 Id. § 1030(a)5(A); see Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418,
419 (7th Cir. 2006).
80 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). “Any person who suffers damage or loss by
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief. A civil action
for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors
set forth in §§ (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of § (c)(4)(A)(i).” Id. § 1030(g) (footnote omitted).
81 See e.g. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Command Transp., LLC, No. 05
Civ. 3401, 2005 WL 3077998, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2005).
82 Galbraith, supra note 68, at 329 (quotation omitted).
83 Sebastian E. Kaplan, The Rise of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Case,
FENWICK & WEST LLP 1 (2012), http://www.fenwick.com/fenwickdocuments/2012-0320_rise_computer_fraud_abuse_case.pdf.
84 132 CONG. REC. 7816 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes).
85 See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009)
(complaint based on emailing documents from a work account to a personal email
address, as well as accessing a website using a username and password furnished by
the employer); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (criminal
prosecution based on setting up a fake Myspace profile in violation of the website’s
terms of service); SKF USA, Inc. v. Bjerkness, 636 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(complaint based on data saved to USB thumb drives); Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc.
v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(complaint based on emailing documents from work email to defendant employer).
86 Bone, supra note 26, at 247.
87 Brenton, supra note 18, at 430.
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otherwise be raised at the state level, likely under a UTSAinspired statute, the CFAA offers employers a number of
benefits over the state-level trade secret statutes.
First, the CFAA offers substantially simpler pleading
requirements compared to equivalent state-level trade secret
law.88 While trade secret law focuses on whether the material
taken rises to the level of a trade secret and whether the
plaintiff took reasonable efforts in protecting the information,89
the CFAA “puts no qualification on the nature or character of
the information taken—it focuses squarely and solely on the
actions of the defendant in obtaining it.”90 In other words,
where trade secret law requires a plaintiff to establish (1) the
existence of a trade secret, (2) reasonable protective efforts, and
(3) wrongful misappropriation, the CFAA focuses only on the
third element, whether the misappropriation was wrongful.91
In addition to its simpler pleading requirements, the
CFAA “provides [plaintiffs with] a basis for federal jurisdiction.”92
By bringing a CFAA claim, employers may bring suit against the
defendant’s new employer as well as the individual, and also seek
injunctive relief, elements not widely available under the UTSAinfluenced state laws.93 Further, the CFAA allows employers to
effectively enforce non-compete agreements that would be
otherwise unenforceable under state law in cases where former
employees use misappropriated information to compete in a
new position.94 And because of supplemental jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), bringing a CFAA claim in federal court
does not preclude employer plaintiffs from raising state trade
secret claims.95 In some cases, employers have recovered
88 For example, a typical state claim for trade secret misappropriation under the
UTSA requires the plaintiff to show that the misappropriated information was secret, that the
plaintiff derived economic value from its secrecy, and that reasonable efforts were made to
maintain the information’s secrecy. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985). Under
the CFAA, a plaintiff is not required to establish any of these elements.
89 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985).
90 Brenton, supra note 18, at 434.
91 Liccardi, supra note 36, at 158.
92 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 418.
93 Id.
94 Peter J. Pizzi, Disloyal Employees: Computer Abuse Law Turns on Meaning
of “Without Authorization,” N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 2006, at 5, available at
http://www.connellfoley.com/sites/default/files/pjp_nylj_disloyal_employees_0.pdf.
95 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2011) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.”). In fact, courts may continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent state claims after dismissing the underlying federal claim.
See, e.g., Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 450, 2013 WL
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damages under both state-level trade secret and CFAA
provisions in the same action.96
While the expanding amendments to the CFAA opened
the doors to private litigation in 1996, it was not until 2000
that employers began to realize the CFAA’s utility in the trade
secret context.97 That year, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington held in Shurgard Storage
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. that the revamped
CFAA could apply to a “rogue employee.”98
In Shurgard, the plaintiff, Shurgard Storage Centers,
Inc., had been an “industry leader” in the development and
maintenance of self-storage facilities in the United States and
abroad for over 25 years.99 In a market with a high barrier to
entry, Shurgard created “a sophisticated system” to determine
potential storage facility sites, markets, and strategies.100 The
defendant, Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., was a direct competitor of
Shurgard, and relatively new to the industry, having entered the
market just three years before the suit.101 Shurgard alleged in its
complaint that Safeguard had offered a job to Eric Leland, a
regional development manager with Shurgard, who was
entrusted with access to a wide array of Shurgard’s business
and marketing information.102 The complaint alleged that
before leaving Shurgard to work for Safeguard, Leland “sent emails to the defendant containing various trade secrets and
proprietary information belonging to the plaintiff.”103 The
complaint further alleged that Leland continued to share
propriety information with Safeguard after leaving Shurgard,
and that Safeguard continued to target other Shurgard
employees based on their intimate knowledge of Shurgard’s
business and marketing plans.104
In denying Safeguard’s motion to dismiss, the District
Court upheld the plaintiff ’ s CFAA claim by finding that
4498993, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) (issuing an opinion on purely state claims
after dismissing the underlying CFAA claim last year).
96 See e.g. Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.
2004) (plaintiff “awarded $150,000 on each of three” violations under the CFAA and an
additional $60,000 for violations of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act).
97 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 418.
98 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
99 Id. at 1122.
100 Id. at 1123.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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Leland’s emails to defendant Safeguard were sent “without
authorization,” despite the fact that Leland had been employed
by Shurgard and had full access to the information in question
at the time of the transfer.105 To reach that conclusion, the
court applied concepts of general agency law to the employee’s
computer usage.106 Specifically, the court relied on § 112 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which states that “the
authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the
principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise
guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”107
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the court found that
the employee’s authorization terminated the moment the
employee “obtained and sent the proprietary information to the
defendant via e-mail.”108 The court went on to uphold the other
two claims asserted under the CFAA,109 but it was this broad,
agency-based interpretation of authorization that seemed to open
the door to future claims by employers under the CFAA.110
Following the court’s decision in Shurgard, employers quickly
realized that the CFAA provided a favorable alternative to statelevel trade secret claims, and private actions alleging claims
under the CFAA began to increase sharply.111
A.

The Debate over Authorization in the CFAA

As private CFAA complaints increase in the
employment and trade secret contexts, courts continue to
struggle with the concept of authorization, which appears to be
Id. at 1124, 1129.
Id. at 1125.
107 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)).
108 Id. In so doing, the court relied on a formulation of authorization that far
pre-dated the invention of the computer. The opinion makes no attempt to show that
the CFAA’s drafters intended authorization to be defined in terms of agency law rather
than in a technological sense. Id.
109 Id. at 1126-27. The court held that Safeguard had established a claim
under § 1030(a)(4), which covers an individual who “‘knowingly and with intent to
defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything
of value [over $5,000].’” Id. at 1125 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012)). The court
also found that Safeguard had established a claim under § 1030(a)(5)(C), which creates
liability for any individual who “‘intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage.’” Id. at 1126 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C)).
110 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 423 (“Although Shurgard was the first case
of its kind, it certainly has not been the only attempt to offer a viable interpretation of
the elusive concept.”).
111 Kaplan, supra note 83, at 1 (“Since 2002, complaints alleging a cause of
action under the CFAA have increased nearly 600%[.]”).
105
106
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the only provision potentially limiting the CFAA’s broad scope.
The authorization requirement found in many of the CFAA’s
substantive sections provides that someone is only liable under
the CFAA if he or she “ . . . accessed a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access.”112 Thus, whether an
employee is authorized, or whether an employee has exceeded
his or her authorized access has in many cases determined the
success or failure of a CFAA claim.113 To complicate the issue,
the CFAA fails to provide a definition of the term
“authorization” as it relates to the statute,114 and it only
provides a definition for the term “exceeds authorized access,”
leaving courts to interpret the phrase “without authorization.”115
The CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter.”116
While a plain reading suggests that “exceeds authorized
access” was intended to cover employees who misappropriate
information from their current job, a number of courts have
instead applied the term “without authorization” to current
employees by adopting an agency-based approach to
authorization.117 To reach this conclusion, some courts have
argued that under principles of agency law, authorization to
access a computer terminates at the moment an employee
breaches a duty of loyalty to his or her employer.118
Other courts have rejected this broad agency
interpretation.119 These courts have held that because the CFAA
is primarily a criminal statute, ambiguous terms should be
decided in favor of lenity.120 Under this approach, if a term is
unclear, it should be interpreted in favor of the defendant and
against the government.121 Thus, the argument runs, it is
improper to hold that someone who has been granted permission
to access to a computer system can access the computer without
authorization, because authorization begins and ends with the
112 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4), & (5)(B)–(C) all contain similar
language related to authorization.
113 Compare Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir.
2006), with LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009).
114 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1132.
115 18 U.S.C § 1030(e)(6).
116 Id. (quotations omitted).
117 See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420; Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
118 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.
119 See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133.
120 Id. at 1134 (citing United States v. Carr, 513 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008)).
121 Id.
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employer’s granting and rescinding access.122 As private litigants
continue to test the outward boundaries of the CFAA’s
applicability in the employment context, these contrasting
interpretations have resulted in a sizable and developing
circuit split that has garnered much attention.123
While first articulated in Shurgard,124 the agency-based
approach to authorization under the CFAA gained prominence
in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin,125 which was
at the time considered “the primary appellate interpretation of
the authorization language in the CFAA.”126 Jacob Citrin was
an employee of International Airport Centers (IAC), tasked
with investigating real estate properties that IAC was
interested in buying.127 After working at IAC for eight years,
Citrin decided to quit his job and compete directly with his former
employer.128 According to the facts alleged by IAC, Citrin
“fraudulently misappropriated” a host of IAC information
including confidential information and work product,129 before
deleting all of the files on his laptop using a “secure-erasure
program” to prevent any recovery of the deleted files.130 IAC sued
Citrin under a number of CFAA provisions, including
§ 1030(a)(5)(B), which establishes liability against any
individual who “intentionally accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct,
recklessly causes damage.”131
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of IAC’s suit,
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
determined that despite the fact that Citrin was employed by
IAC at the time he accessed the computer, his access was
nonetheless “without authorization.”132 To reach this conclusion,
Id. at 1135.
See, e.g., Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, Fourth Circuit Widens Split Over
CFAA and Employees Violating Computer Use Restrictions, KILPATRICK TOWNSEND (Sept.
10, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=305497&id=
1585568&filename=asr-1585570.CFAA.pdf.
124 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
125 Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
126 Amber L. Leaders, Gimme A Brekka!: Deciphering “Authorization” Under
the CFAA and How Employers Can Protect Their Data, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 285,
289 (2011).
127 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
128 Id; see also Brief for Respondent, Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (No. 06-2073), 2006
WL 1354181, at *2.
129 Int’l Airport Centers LLC v. Citrin, 2005 WL 241463, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
31, 2005).
130 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
131 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(5)(B) (2012).
132 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
122
123
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Judge Posner employed the agency approach introduced in
Shurgard133 and determined that Citrin’s authorization had
ended the very moment he decided he would delete the
incriminating files from his work computer.134 Posner reasoned
that Citrin’s “authorization to access the laptop terminated
when, having already engaged in misconduct and decided to
quit IAC in violation of his employment contract, he resolved to
destroy files . . . in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency
law imposes on an employee.”135
While Citrin is one of the most notable examples of the
agency-based approach to authorization under the CFAA,136 a
number of courts have followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead and
adopted a broad reading of authorization. In United States v. John,
the Fifth Circuit found that even where an employee has full access
to a computer system, he or she can still act without authorization
because authorization under the CFAA encompasses “the use of
information obtained by permitted access to a computer system
and data available on that system.”137 In United States v.
Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee of the Social
Security Administration with full permission to view sensitive
personal information on SSA computers, but who accessed that
information in romantic pursuit of a number of women in his
church study group, likewise violated the CFAA because his
computer use violated a written SSA policy.138
Some commentators have leveled a number of similar
but distinct criticisms at the broad, agency-based approach to
authorization under the CFAA. Perhaps the most common
criticism of the agency approach is that such an interpretation
almost certainly reaches more employee conduct than
legislatively intended.139 For example, under the agency approach,
one could argue that “[a]n employee who checks their personal
email at work, in violation of company policy, would be a
criminal.”140 Finding no clear support in the legislative record, this
133 See supra Part II, explaining the Shurgard court’s reliance on the
Restatement (Second) of Agency to interpret the phrase “without authorization.”
134 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
135 Id.
136 Leaders, supra note 126, at 289.
137 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010).
138 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011).
139 Kaplan, supra note 83, at 1.
140 David J. Rosen, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A CodeBased Approach to “Exceeds Authorized Access”, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 737, 750 (2012)
(quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1586-86 (2010)).
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broad scope is only compounded by the probability that the vast
majority of employees remain unaware that such a wide range of
their workplace conduct could lead to civil and even criminal
liability. The “agency approach ‘gives employees insufficient
notice of what line distinguishes computer use that is allowed
from computer use that is prohibited.’”141 This lack of clarity is
particularly troubling in an increasingly fluid workplace, where
employees switch jobs with greater frequency, and seek to
bring their skills and experience with them.142 Further, the line
between personal and work-based computing is constantly
blurring, which can lead employees to take unlawful action
that they do not have any reason to believe is unlawful.143
Another common argument leveled against the agency
approach is one of statutory construction:
[T]he agency approach, if applied to the text of §§ 1030(a)(2) and (a)(4),
would collapse the distinction between “without authorization” and
“exceeds authorized access.” If an employee’s authorization to access a
computer ceases as soon as she does something that is not in her
employer’s interests, then “exceeds authorized access” likely becomes
textually superfluous and meaningless.144

Put differently, arguing that an employee acts “without
authorization” as soon as the employee acts contrary to his or her
employer’s interests would render the “exceeds authorized access”
provision absurd. Under this reading an employee could only
“exceed[ ] authorized access” by wrongfully misappropriating data
while continuing to maintain an appropriate agent-principal
relationship. Because such misappropriation would have to be
aligned with the employer’s interests, it seems impossible for an
employer to successfully claim injury under this provision.145
141 Id. (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1586 (2010)).
142 See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 74-83 (2004); see also
Krebs, supra note 49.
143 “[M]ore employees are storing their business and customer contacts online
at services like LinkedIn.com, some employees may not believe they are doing anything
wrong when they take customer lists and other internal company data when they move
on to a new job.” Krebs, supra note 49.
144 Rosen, supra note 140, at 751 (footnotes omitted).
145 An online commenter attempts to provide a hypothetical fulfilling such a
definition of “exceeds authorized access”:

Scenario: Boss asks employee to print out his schedule for the coming week.
Employee, without asking Boss, uses Boss’ CPU to print it from the cloud. In
the process of printing it out, Employee also sends the pre-meeting notes
from the same file to the printer in her office. Employee then faxes the premeeting notes to a competitor who sends her $6k.
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While this broad view of authorization still has firm support in
some circuits, “[a] growing number of cases are adopting the
narrow view.”146
On the other side of the circuit split is a narrower
interpretation of authorization, “holding that the CFAA prohibits
improper ‘access’ of computer information, rather than misuse or
misappropriation of such information.”147 Under this narrow view,
also called the “[p]lain [l]anguage [i]nterpretation,”148
“[a]uthorization begins and ends with the employer, not the
employee . . . . An employee acts without authorization only if the
employer never gives permission or affirmatively rescinds
permission.”149 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in LVRC Holdings,
LLC v. Brekka is considered the leading view on the narrow
interpretation of CFAA authorization.150
Joseph Brekka was hired by LVRC, a residential
addiction treatment center, to oversee various operations within
the facility, including marketing programs.151 “At the time [he]
was hired [by LVRC], Brekka owned and operated” two
consulting businesses that used internet marketing to connect
patients with addiction care facilities.152 While working for
LVRC and continuing to run his own businesses, Brekka
emailed a number of documents related to his work for LVRC to
his personal email account.153 In addition, after resigning from
LVRC, Brekka continued to use login credentials issued to him
by LVRC to access a system which provided internet traffic
statistics relating to LVRC’s website.154 Upon learning of the
emails Brekka sent to his personal account and the continued
access to the internet traffic site, LVRC brought a federal
action under the CFAA. LVRC alleged that Brekka’s conduct
violated two provisions of the CFAA,155 both of which require
Not legal advice. Don’t rely., Comment to Recent Developments—Both in the Courts and
in Congress—on the Scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/30/recent-developmentsboth-in-the-courts-and-in-congress-on-the-scope-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/.
146 Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 450, 2012 WL
2524008, at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012).
147 Id. at *3.
148 Leaders, supra note 126, at 290.
149 Id. at 291.
150 Id.
151 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1129-30.
154 Id. at 1130.
155 Section
1030(a)(2) provides for relief against any individual who
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.” 18 U.S.C.
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that the individual either acted “without authorization,” or
“exceed[ed] authorized access.”156 In upholding the district court’s
motion to dismiss the claim, the Ninth Circuit rejected the agency
reading of authorization, noting that “[n]o language in the CFAA
supports [the] argument that authorization to use a computer
ceases when an employee resolves to use the computer contrary to
the employer’s interest.”157 Instead the court defined authorization
“as taking [its] ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”158
Under this interpretation, the fact that LVRC had given
permission to use the computer meant that Brekka had
authorization at the time of access, and thus there was no
cause of action under the CFAA.159
A number of courts have agreed with the reasoning set
forth in Brekka, adopting a narrow, “plain language”
interpretation of authorization under the CFAA.160 Most
recently, the Fourth Circuit, in WEC Carolina Energy
Solutions, LLC v. Miller, joined the Ninth Circuit’s narrow
interpretation.161 In WEC, the plaintiff alleged that Mike
Miller, a former WEC employee who began working for a direct
competitor, had emailed a number of proprietary WEC documents
to himself before quitting, and had subsequently used those
documents in a presentation given to a potential client on behalf
of his new employer.162 The court held that WEC’s policy
prohibiting employees from downloading proprietary information
to personal computers did not constitute a revocation of
authorization, and while the information may have been
misappropriated, it did not occur via unauthorized access.163
While support is not as clear at the circuit level, a number of
district courts have signaled their support for a narrow reading.164
§ 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). Section 1030(a)(4) provides for relief against any individual who
“knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the
intended fraud and obtains anything of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
156 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (4); Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1131.
157 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133.
158 Id. at 1132 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
159 Id. at 1137.
160 See Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 450, 2012 WL
2524008, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex
Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
161 WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012);
see also Nicholas J. Wagoner, 4th Circuit Deepens Division Over Scope of Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/08/4th-circuitdeepens-division-over-scope-of-computer-fraud-abuse-act.html.
162 Miller, 687 F.3d at 201-02.
163 Id. at 207.
164 See Dana Ltd., 2012 WL 2524008, at *5; Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.
Supp. 2d at 386.
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For example, the court in Dana Limited v. American Axle and
Manufacturing Holdings, Inc. in Michigan’s Western District,
indicated that the Sixth Circuit is likely to rely on the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning and adopt the narrow interpretation of
authorization.165 In Orbit One Communications, Inc. v.
Numerex Corp., the District Court for the Southern District of
New York indicated that the Second Circuit is likely to join in
adopting a narrow interpretation.166 In addition to support from
the district courts, the Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its
prior rule in United States v. Nosal, in which a former
employee of an executive search firm convinced a number of
former colleagues to help him start a competing firm by
“us[ing] their log-in credentials to download source lists, names
and contact information from a confidential database on the
company’s computer.”167
B.

Legislative Proposals to Amend the CFAA

In addition to increasing jurisprudential support, it seems
that a narrow interpretation of authorization may be gaining favor
with legislators, albeit slowly.168 Senator Patrick Leahy proposed
an amendment to the CFAA as part of the Cybersecurity Act of
2012 that would enhance the CFAA’s penalties, while officially
adopting a narrow view of authorization.169 Specifically, the
amendment would alter § 1030(e)6, to provide that ‘without
authorization’
does not include access in violation of a contractual obligation or
agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service
agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet website, or
non-government employer, if such violation constitutes the sole basis

Dana Ltd., 2012 WL 2524008, at *4-5.
Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
167 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012).
168 See Orin Kerr, Recent Developments—Both in the Courts and in Congress—
on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/30/recent-developments-both-in-the-courts-and-incongress-on-the-scope-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/; see also Tony Romm, After
Activist Aaron Swartz’s Death, a Tough Slog for Aaron’s Law, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2013,
4:48 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/activist-aaron-swartz-death-aaronslaw-87332.html (explaining that legislative efforts to narrow the CFAA are at “the
beginning of a new and lengthy political journey.”).
169 Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, S.3414, 112th Cong. § 8 (proposed
amendment, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/
07/Leahy-Cybercrime-Amendment-to-S3414JEN12557.pdf.
165
166
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Essentially, the amendment would preclude the agency
interpretation by providing that a breach of an agreement such
as a computer use policy cannot, by itself, establish liability
under the CFAA. Not surprisingly, the Department of Justice
voiced support for the stricter penalties proposed by the
amendment, while opposing the narrowed scope.171
While the Senate voted down the Cybersecurity Act,
Leahy’s amendment was revived in early 2013, following the
suicide of Aaron Swartz, a computer programmer and internet
activist who had been indicted two years earlier under the
CFAA for attempting to download and distribute a vast portion
of JSTOR’s academic research database.172 Following Swartz’s
death, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren introduced a legislative
amendment to the CFAA dubbed “Aaron’s Law,” that essentially
mirrored the Leahy amendment.173 It would amend the CFAA to
establish that “unauthorized access does not include access in
violation of an agreement or contractual obligation, such as an
acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an
Internet service provider, Internet website, or employer.”174
Despite apparent widespread public support for the narrowing
language included in Aaron’s Law, the language was notably
absent from draft changes to the CFAA distributed to the House
Judiciary Committee in 2013.175 In fact, the amended language
Id.
Greg Nojeim & Jake Laperruque, Why Fibbing About Your Age is Relevant
to the Cybersecurity Bill, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 30, 2012),
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/greg-nojeim/3007why-fibbing-about-your-age-relevantcybersecurity-bill; see also Kerr, supra note 168.
172 Timothy B. Lee, “Aaron’s Law, Congressional investigation in wake of Swartz
suicide, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/aaronslaw-congressional-investigation-in-wake-of-swartz-suicide/.
173 In fact, the language of the two amendments are almost completely
identical, save for a few stylistic changes. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454,
113th Cong. (introduced by R. Zoe Lofgren), available at http://www.lofgren.house.gov/
images/user_images/gt/stories/pdf/aarons%20law%20-%20lofgren%20-%20061913.pdf.
174 Lee, supra note 172 (internal quotation omitted). Perhaps reflecting the
lack of legislative understanding of the CFAA, “Aaron’s Law” would not have had any
impact on Swartz’s conviction under the CFAA, as Swartz would have been equally
liable under the narrow view of authorization which the amendment would have
established. Andy Greenberg, “Aaron’s Law” Suggests Reforms to Computer Fraud Act
(But Not Enough to Have Protected Aaron Swartz), FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013, 8:58 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/01/16/aarons-law-suggests-reforms-tohacking-acts-but-not-enough-to-have-protected-aaron-swartz/.
175 See H.R., 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
132249133/House-Judiciary-Committee-discussion-draft (a discussion draft concerning
changes distributed to House Judiciary Committee).
170
171
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before the House Judiciary Committee would actually expand the
CFAA’s scope by increasing maximum penalties and punishing
attempted CFAA violations as seriously as actual offenses.176
Thus, while narrowing the CFAA’s authorization language may
be gaining popular support, it seems that legislative action is
still far off.177
C.

The CFAA’s Impact on Policy Goals of Trade Secret Law

Considering the rise of the CFAA in the trade secret and
employment context against the backdrop of substantive trade
secret legislation, it is apparent that the CFAA undercuts
several of the goals advanced by trade secret law.178 As
discussed, trade secret law strikes an important “balance between
safeguarding business information and guaranteeing employee
mobility.”179 This balance results from the emphasis that trade
secret law places on the character of misappropriated data. While
it is important for companies to protect sufficiently valuable
information, it is equally important that employees be allowed to
bring their skills and experiences with them to new jobs.180
By ignoring the character of the information
misappropriated, the CFAA disrupts this balance, eroding both
the evidentiary and value-identifying purposes furthered by the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act requirement of reasonably protective
measures.181 For the courts, the fact that a defendant has to
overcome reasonably protective measures to misappropriate a
trade secret serves a strong evidentiary function, indicating that
the misappropriation was indeed wrongful.182 Further, the
protections serve to put both the court, as well as the defendant,
on notice that the information at issue was valuable to the
employer and that a judicial remedy is therefore appropriate.183
In contrast, the CFAA offers no such protection, and does not
176 See id.; see also Orin Kerr, House Judiciary Committee New Draft Bill on
Cybersecurity is Mostly DOJ’s Proposed Language from 2011, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Mar. 25, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/25/house-judiciary-committeenew-draft-bill-on-cybersecurity-is-mostly-dojs-proposed-language-from-2011/.
177 See Orin Kerr, The Prospects for Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/
02/09/the-prospects-for-reform-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/.
178 See Brenton, supra note 18, at 447.
179 Id. at 449.
180 Id.
181 See supra Part II (discussing the theoretical goals furthered by requiring
reasonable protective efforts in trade secret law).
182 See supra Part II.
183 See supra Part II.
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require anything that would put an employee on notice that
such information is secretive and worth protecting. It could be
argued that the CFAA’s authorization provision sufficiently
puts an employee on notice as to whether information is fair
game or not. However, this argument fails under the broad
agency-based definition of authorization under the CFAA
adopted by some courts, under which an employee’s actions,
rather than an employer’s restrictions on access determine
whether the employee acts without authorization.184
Beyond eroding the theoretical policy considerations of
trade secret law, the CFAA’s lack of a reasonably protective
measures requirement may discourage employers from adequately
investing in data protection, which is economically inefficient.185 In
the Ponemon Institute’s 2009 study gauging CEO, COO, and CFO
attitudes toward investment in data protection, executives
pointed to many benefits of investing in data protection beyond
reducing the risk of data loss or theft.186 Executives noted that
investment in such protection also resulted in increased customer
trust, decreased “customer churn,” reduced risk of penalty under
e-discovery
laws
and
other
regulations,
and
“reduc[ed] . . . operational inefficiencies by creating more efficient
uses of data.”187 The study further suggested a “very healthy
[return on investment] for such data protection systems.”188
In addition to the general success and secondary benefits
created by effective data protection programs, there remains the
very practical and obvious consideration that data protection will
prevent misappropriation in the first place.189 By preventing data
theft through simple security investments, employers save the
cost of litigating preventable disputes, and society benefits by
reducing the load placed on an already overburdened federal
court system.190 Despite the widespread benefits and availability
of effective data protection systems, the CFAA in its current form
includes no requirement that an employer take even marginal
184 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010);
Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
185 See PONEMON INST. LLC, supra note 50, at 14.
186 Id. at 4-5.
187 Id. at 3.
188 Id.
189 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363.
190 See, e.g., Press Release, Diane Feinstein Senate Office, Senator Feinstein
Introduces Legislation to Reduce Caseload in Overburdened Federal Courts (May 17,
2011), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=ff6add36-50568059-7638-184ec11315cd.
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efforts to protect its data in order to make out a claim, allowing
it to serve as an end run on trade secret law.
III.

POLICY REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING A NARROW
READING OF AUTHORIZATION

A formal legislative or judicial adoption of the narrow
interpretation of authorization, as laid out in Brekka, would
prevent the CFAA from undercutting trade secret law. By
requiring that an employee do more than simply violate an
employer’s acceptable use policy to exceed authorized access,
proposals such as Leahy’s amendment and “Aaron’s Law” would
functionally establish a rudimentary reasonable efforts
requirement in the CFAA.191 By requiring that a defendant have
breached some form of protection beyond a written computer use
policy effectively means that to bring a claim under the CFAA,
employers would have to restrict computer access beyond merely
instituting a written computer use policy. This requirement
could serve, at least in part, the evidentiary purpose of
requiring reasonably protective efforts.192 When an employee
misappropriates information in violation of only a computer
use policy, such a violation carries little, if any, evidentiary
value in demonstrating to the fact finder that the employee’s
actions were wrongful.
By requiring the breach of a computer use policy along
with the breach of some other form of protection, Leahy’s
proposed amendment would demonstrate to fact finders, at least
to some degree, that the misappropriation might have been
wrongful.193 Requiring more than a breach of an employer’s
computer use policy would also serve to more effectively put
employees on notice as to when their conduct is wrongful and
potentially illegal. Conceding that the amendment would be
helpful in an evidentiary sense, it likewise presents a vagueness
that could quickly become a source of judicial disagreement: while
the breach of a computer use policy cannot be the sole basis for
finding a lack of authorization,194 what protection would be
sufficient? Limiting physical access to a computer system
would almost certainly be enough, but courts could also find
191
192

See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii) (1985).
See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th

Cir. 1991).
193 Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, S. 3414, 112th Cong. § 8 (proposed
amendment, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/
07/Leahy-Cybercrime-Amendment-to-S3414JEN12557.pdf.
194 Id.
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that the breach of a computer use policy, along with the breach
of some other policy, such as a confidentiality agreement or
non-compete agreement, is sufficient. This limiting provision
would be helpful, but could create a new type of confusion in
computer use jurisprudence.
IV.

A “REASONABLE EFFORTS” AMENDMENT TO THE CFAA

Establishing a narrow reading of authorization would be
a step in the right direction, but does not go far enough to
prevent the CFAA from undermining the policy goals of trade
secret law. This is primarily because, even under a narrow view
of authorization, the CFAA is still only concerned with the nature
of the misappropriation, and fails to consider the character of the
information misappropriated.195 Where trade secret law
distinguishes between that information which merits protection
and that information which does not, the CFAA, under either a
broad or narrow reading, makes no such distinction.196 But it is
this very distinction that, in trade secret law, preserves the
balance between employee mobility on the one hand (by
declining to protect some information), and encouraging
innovation on the other (by protecting information that merits
such protection).197
Even under a narrow reading of authorization, an
employer could still bring a CFAA claim over misappropriated
data regardless of whether that data merited the protection it
received.198 Further, while narrowing the CFAA’s scope may
mirror the evidentiary benefits of reasonable effort provisions
in trade secret law, a narrowed CFAA serves none of the value
identifying functions performed by reasonable efforts in trade
secret law.199 By not requiring information to be reasonably
protected to make out a claim, the CFAA does nothing to signal
to either courts or employees that a particular file or document
is so valued by an employer that it merits special protection. By
focusing only on authorization to access the information in the
first place, the CFAA establishes one broad level of protection
Brenton, supra note 18, at 434.
See § 1030(a)(2)(C) (providing liability for anyone who “intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby
obtains . . . information from any protected computer”).
197 See Bone, supra note 26, at 262.
198 For example, even under a narrow interpretation, an employee would be
liable for downloading non-secret marketing materials or client lists if the materials were
downloaded from a network which the employee did not have permission to access.
199 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 925 F.2d at 179.
195
196
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for all information contained on a given computer system,
regardless of whether that information is private or public,
valuable or worthless.200 Lastly, by failing to consider the
character of the information misappropriated, a narrowly
interpreted CFAA perpetuates an inefficient labor market,
where employees are unsure what information they may take
with them to new positions, and what information belongs to
their employer.201 While narrowing the scope of the CFAA by
legislative amendment is certainly a step in the right direction,
even a narrowly interpreted CFAA threatens to erode the
careful policy considerations behind trade secret law.
Amending the CFAA to include a requirement that
misappropriated information must have been subject to
reasonably protective measures would eliminate most, if not
all, concerns that the CFAA impinges too greatly on trade
secret law. Specifically, Congress should amend the CFAA’s
authorization provision such that it applies to anyone who
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information
from any protected computer, provided that such information is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”202
By amending this provision, the CFAA would more
closely mirror the substantive pleading requirements of trade
secret law,203 lowering the incentive for employers to favor the
CFAA over state-level trade secret statutes. Such an amendment
would uphold the balance established by trade secret law between
protecting valuable proprietary information, while allowing
employees to utilize for their own individual benefit information
that does not warrant protection.204 By requiring employers to show
that they reasonably protected their information, the CFAA would
provide valuable evidence to fact finders indicating that a
defendant was wrongful in misappropriating that information,
while also signaling to courts and employees that the information
was important enough to merit such protection.205
200 See § 1030(a)(2)(C). Notice how the provision does not qualify the term
“information” in any way.
201 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 575, 592 (2007).
202 This proposed amendment draws language directly from the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C); Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii) (1985).
203 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985).
204 See Bone, supra note 26, at 262.
205 Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 178.
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This amendment would also serve to keep the CFAA
adaptable in a constantly changing technological environment.
Those securities measures considered reasonable today may be
wholly unsatisfactory several years from now. As technology
advances and the cost of sophisticated data protection decreases,
this fact-sensitive approach would allow courts to hold employers to
an appropriate and contemporary standard of data protection.206
Most importantly, amending the CFAA to include a
reasonable efforts provision would bring the statute more closely
in line with its original purpose—to provide much needed
protection at the federal level against the threat of serious
security breaches executed by sophisticated computer hackers.207
There is no question that an employer should be adequately
protected against individuals who wrongfully hack into a
computer system and steal valuable information. That said,
there is no reason that employers should be excused from the
responsibility of protecting their information in a reasonable
manner, simply because that information is stored on a
computer. By amending the CFAA to include a reasonable
efforts provision, Congress will ensure that employers continue
to enjoy protection against sophisticated data theft, and in
exchange, need only protect their information in a manner that
is considered reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
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